Influence of board and ownership structure on bank profitability: evidence from South East Europe by Predrag Stančić et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rero20
Download by: [94.250.135.147] Date: 24 December 2016, At: 04:51
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja
ISSN: 1331-677X (Print) 1848-9664 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rero20
Influence of board and ownership structure on
bank profitability: evidence from South East
Europe
Predrag Stančić, Milan Čupić & Vladimir Obradović
To cite this article: Predrag Stančić, Milan Čupić & Vladimir Obradović (2014)
Influence of board and ownership structure on bank profitability: evidence from
South East Europe, Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 27:1, 573-589, DOI:
10.1080/1331677X.2014.970450
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2014.970450
© 2014 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis
Published online: 03 Nov 2014.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 976
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Influence of board and ownership structure on bank profitability:
evidence from South East Europe
Predrag Stančić, Milan Čupić* and Vladimir Obradović
Faculty of Economics, University of Kragujevac, Djure Pucara Starog 3, 34000 Kagujevac,
Serbia
(Received 5 June 2012; accepted 17 September 2014)
We investigate the impact of board and ownership structure on profitability of 74
commercial banks from four transition economies of South East Europe over the
2005–2010 period. We analyse this relation using Ordinary Least Squares regression
analysis on an unbalanced panel data-set of 377 observations. We find negative and
significant relationship between board size and bank profitability, while the propor-
tion of independent directors on the board is negatively, but insignificantly related to
bank profitability. Impact of ownership concentration on bank profitability is
negative, but weak. We also find that privately held domestic banks outperform
state-owned and foreign banks. Important factors influencing bank profitability in
South East Europe are also bank size and bank capitalisation.
Keywords: commercial banks; board structure; ownership structure; bank profitability
JEL classification: G21, G34.
1. Introduction
The objective of this article is to examine the profitability of banks operating in four
South East European (SEE) transition economies, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, and the impact of bank governance, ownership struc-
ture, and other bank specific factors on bank profitability. We focus on a specific indus-
try in specific environment of transition economies for two reasons. First, although
some aspects of governance in nonfinancial firms can be applied to banks, complexity
of banking business increase information asymmetry and make it difficult to sharehold-
ers and other stakeholders to monitor bank managers. Banks are also a key element in
the payment system, and are subject to more intense regulation than other firms. Sec-
ond, weak institutional environment, weak protection of investors and high ownership
concentration in transition economies give rise to conflicts between controlling share-
holder and minority shareholders more often than between managers and shareholders.
In this regard, La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2002) and Young,
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, and Jiang (2008) stress that, unlike developed economies
where principal-agent conflicts are major concern of corporate governance, principal–
principal conflicts are major issue in emerging economies requiring solutions beyond
those devised in standard agency theory.
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More specifically, we focus on SEE transition economies for two reasons. Firstly,
with the economic and political stabilisation in the middle of 1990s, SEE economies
finally initiated real economy and banking industry reforms, but with a delay in
comparison to Central and East European (CEE) economies due to numerous political
and institutional obstacles, macroeconomic instability and structural weaknesses (see
Radzic & Yuce, 2008). All the CEE economies became EU members by 2004, while
among SEE economies only Bulgaria and Romania are EU members (since 2007).
Differences in the transition process and level of development between CEE and SEE
transition economies may have differently influenced the performance of the banks
operating in these two regions. Secondly, despite some problems and delays, SEE
economies have conducted many banking industry reforms and eventually developed
privately-owned banking industry and interbank market. Bearing in mind that a
competitive and efficient banking system is important to reduce the gap between
SEE economies and the rest of Europe, it is of interest to investigate how well
banking industries of SEE economies perform and what factors influence bank
performance.
This article reports on an investigation of the relationship between board structure
and bank performance on a sample of 74 commercial banks in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia over the 2005–2010 period. The basic
question that we want to answer is whether corporate governance and ownership
structure can significantly influence performance of a bank operating in SEE transi-
tion economy. We use the board composition (BC) and board size (BS) as the cor-
porate governance variables, ownership concentration ratio and ownership type as the
ownership structure variables, while the bank performance is approximated with
return on assets (ROA), which is consistent with some previous studies (Bektas &
Kaymak, 2009; Stančić, Čupić, & Barjaktarović Rakočević, 2012). By studying a
single (banking) industry in economic conditions specific for transition economies,
we aim at explaining the way governance affects performance and whether this rela-
tionship can be expected to differ across different industries and different economic
systems. Since this research covers the years 2005 through 2010 we analyse possible
influence of financial crisis on the relationship between bank governance and
performance.
The investigation of the possible determinants of bank performance can have several
implications relevant for policymakers and investors in SEE transition economies. Anal-
ysis of the relations between ownership structure and bank performance, and differences
in profitability between state, foreign and private domestic banks has implications for
policies toward privatisation, entry barriers and investor protection. Analysis of the rela-
tion between bank governance (ownership concentration and board structure) and perfor-
mance has implications for investors developing effective bank governance policies, and
policymakers developing legal and institutional framework for bank governance. This
study contributes to the literature that analyses bank performance, especially those
operating in transition economies, and literature that deals with influence of ownership
structure and bank governance on performance of banks operating in transition
economies.
The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 presents related literature.
Section 3 describes our data and methodology. In Section 4 we present our results. We
conclude in Section 5.
574 P. Stančić et al.
2. Literature review
In this section we review theoretical and empirical studies on the impact of ownership
structure and corporate governance on bank performance. We pay special attention to
banks in emerging and transition economies.
2.1. Ownership structure and bank performance
The general Berle-Means model of corporate governance, aimed at resolving the agency
problem that arises between agent (manager) and principal (shareholders), is typical for
the developed economic systems with strong legal protection of investors where publicly
traded firms are generally widely held, while the roles of managers and owners are
clearly separated (La Porta et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008). On the other hand, corpo-
rate governance in transition economies is characterised by underdeveloped capital mar-
ket, poor investor protection and high ownership concentration (Bobirca & Miclaus,
2007) which make the enforcement of agency contracts more costly. Due to weak inves-
tor protection, publicly traded firms operating in transition economies often have large
(controlling) shareholder, who is able to monitor and discipline managers more effi-
ciently than small shareholders. However, controlling shareholder has the power to
expropriate minority shareholder rights, which results in frequent conflicts between con-
trolling shareholder (La Porta et al., 2002; Young et al., 2008). In this article we investi-
gate possible influence of ownership structure on bank profitability in the specific
context of SEE transition economies characterised by underdeveloped stock market,
high ownership concentration, high foreign ownership and weak investor protection
(Radzic & Yuce, 2008; Suljkanovic, 2007; Stančić, Todorović, & Čupić, 2012a).
Since Demsetz (1983) argued that there is no reason to expect a systematic relation-
ship between profitability and ownership structure, numerous studies have been pub-
lished finding evidence for this argument (e.g. Agoraki, Delis, & Staikouras, 2010;
Bektas & Kaymak, 2009; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi,
2007). Nevertheless, many authors find strong relationship between ownership concen-
tration and firm performance. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) find a positive relation-
ship between ownership concentration and firm performance in Greece. The authors
explain that this result suggests that the greater the ownership concentration, the more
effectively management behaviour is monitored and disciplined, thus resulting in better
performance. Claessens and Djankov (1999) argue that the significant positive relation-
ship between ownership concentration and firm performance of Czech companies ques-
tion the value of distributing shares to a large number of shareholders in an
environment that gives them little chance to exercise their ownership control rights.
Earle, Kucsera, and Telegdy (2004) find that increased concentration of ownership in
the hands of a single large shareholder is associated with improved corporate perfor-
mance of Hungarian publicly listed firms.
Many authors investigating ownership concentration in transition and emerging
economies find negative influence of ownership concentration on firm performance
(Filatotchev, Kapelyushnikov, Dyomina, & Aukutsionek, 2001; Ivashkovskaya,
Ivantsova, & Stepanova, 2012; Stančić et al., 2012). To interpret their results,
Filatotchev et al. (2001) argue that ownership concentration in transition economies may
provide negative effect on performance because inadequate protection of minority share-
holders may provide majority shareholder with a possibility to expropriate substantial
amounts of corporate wealth. Stančić et al. (2012) find that the profitability of banks
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operating in Serbia decrease with the increase in ownership concentration. Based on
investigation of bank governance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Matic and Papac (2010)
argue that ownership concentration can cause serious problems in foreign banks
operating in the context of weak institutional context. Given the results of many prior
studies examining the samples from transition economies, we expect to find a negative
correlation between bank profitability and ownership concentration ratio.
Many studies also investigate relation between type of bank ownership (foreign,
state and private–domestic) and bank profitability. Majority of studies find that private–
domestic banks are more profitable than state-owned banks, while foreign banks are
more profitable than private–domestic banks operating in emerging and transition econo-
mies (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001; Jemrić & Vujičić, 2002; Micco,
Panizza, & Yanez, 2007; Tochkov & Nenovsky, 2011). Micco et al. (2007) find that
state-owned banks located in developing countries are less profitable than their private
counterparts and stress that their result may be due to the fact that developing countries
are less than high-income countries equipped to deal with the distortions that arise from
government ownership of banks. However, they add that public banks operating in
developing countries still play a development role and their low profitability may be
due to the fact that, rather than maximising profits, they respond to a social mandate.
Claessens et al. (2001) find that in developing economies foreign banks tend to have
higher interest margin, profitability, and tax payments than domestic banks. They argue
that their result is consistent with hypothesis that entry of foreign banks may improve
the functioning of national banking markets, with positive implications for banking
customers.
Nevertheless, there are studies finding negative relation between foreign ownership
and bank profitability in developing economies. Ivashkovskaya et al. (2012) find that
foreign ownership is a negative value driver for banks in emerging markets because of
a lack of motivation and negotiation power of foreign shareholders comparing to domes-
tic ones. They also find that state ownership has a positive impact on bank profitability
in the period of global crisis in emerging markets, mainly due to the fact that govern-
ment-owned banks have an access to special benefits such as government subsidy and
loans with the interest rate lower than the market one which may help them to survive
in times of financial crisis. Unlike the majority of previous studies finding strong influ-
ence of ownership type on firm profitability, Košak (2011), Košak and Čok (2008) and
Suljkanovic (2007) find only limited differentiation in the profitability between foreign
and domestic banks across SEE economies. However, based on results of previous stud-
ies examining influence of ownership type on bank profitability we expect to find that
private–domestic banks are more profitable than state-owned banks, while foreign banks
are more profitable than private–domestic banks.
2.2. Board structure and bank performance
In economies with weak legal protection of investors, corporate governance is the means
by which minority shareholders are protected from expropriation of their rights by man-
agers and controlling shareholder. Institutions that are important external governance
mechanisms in developed economies, such as capital market, securities regulators, insti-
tutional investors, judiciary, are weak in transition economies. High quality of disclosure
and strong boards of directors are, therefore, potentially important internal governance
mechanisms in these economies (Stančić et al., 2012a). Dahya, Dimitrov, and
McConnell (2008) argue that the board is the most important part of a firm corporate
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governance structure. They also argue that the role of the board in firms with a
dominant shareholder operating in conditions of weak legal protection of investors could
be understood in two ways. It can be assumed that the board of directors in such cir-
cumstances can improve company performance more than in countries with strong legal
protection of investors, where other governance mechanisms are efficient. However, it
could be argued that the board has no power in countries with weak protection of inves-
tors, since the board is at the mercy of the dominant shareholder. The empirical studies
on board effectiveness, both in nonfinancial and financial firms, focus mainly on two
board characteristics – BC and BS.
The BC varies according to the representation of insiders, outsiders and sharehold-
ers, which have different monitoring capacities and interests. The literature has focused
mainly on the proportion of independent or outside directors. Although there are some
studies finding negative relationships between board independence and firm performance
(e.g. Ivashkovskaya et al., 2012), numerous studies have indicated that a board with a
high proportion of independent directors can protect the interests of minority sharehold-
ers and improve company performance in economies with weak legal protection of
investors. For example, Dahya et al. (2008) and Durnev and Kim (2005) find that a
strong board can offset the market value discount in firms with a dominant owner, much
more in a country with weak, than in countries with strong, legal protection of investors.
Bektas and Kaymak (2008) and Pathan, Skully, and Wickramanayake (2007) find signif-
icant positive relation between board independence and bank performance of Turkish
and Thai banks, respectively. There are, nevertheless, studies (Adams & Mehran, 2008;
Stančić et al., 2012) finding no significant relation between BC and bank performance.
Stančić et al. (2012) show that large shareholders in Serbian banks tend to appoint weak
boards, which can lead to serious conflicts between dominant and minority shareholders.
Based on results of studies on corporate governance in developing countries with weak
protection of investors we expect to find a positive relationship between board indepen-
dence and bank performance.
The important question is whether BS affects performance. Several studies have
indicated a negative correlation between BS and firm performance. For example,
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that excessive boards lead to problems of coordi-
nation, control and flexibility in decision-making. Many authors confirm this argument
in their empirical investigations (Pathan et al., 2007; Stančić et al., 2012; Yermack,
1996). Yermack (1996) finds a statistically significant negative relationship between BS
and Tobin’s Q of US industrial corporations. Stančić et al. (2012) find a negative rela-
tionship between BS and profitability for a sample of banks operating in Serbia, while
Pathan et al. (2007) report similar result for sample of Thai banks. On the other hand,
Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand (1999) suggest that larger boards may be benefi-
cial because they increase the pool of expertise available to an organisation. Adams and
Mehran (2008) show that large boards have no negative impact on bank performance.
There are, nevertheless, studies finding no significant or weak relationship between BS
and firm performance (Bektas & Kaymak, 2009; Dahya et al., 2008; Ivashkovskaya
et al., 2012). Based on results of previous studies on influence of BS on firm perfor-
mance we expect to a find negative relationship between BS and bank performance.
Since this research covers the 2005–2010 period it will indirectly point to the role
of the bank board during the periods of financial crisis. In this regard, our study com-
plements studies such as Erkens, Hung, and Matos (2009) and Beltratti and Stulz
(2009). Erkens et al. (2009) found that financial firms with higher proportion of inde-
pendent directors on the board have suffered greater losses during the crisis. They find
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that firms with more independent boards were more likely to raise capital during the
crisis and to disclose larger write-downs than other firms. Beltratti and Stulz (2009)
found that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during the per-
iod from July 2007 to December 2008. They, however, explain that their result does not
mean that board independence is bad, but that banks that were directed by their boards
to maximise shareholder wealth before the crisis took risks that were understood to cre-
ate shareholder wealth, but were costly afterwards because of outcomes that were not
expected when the risks were taken. To take into consideration possible influence of
financial crisis on the relationship between bank governance and performance we split
our sample into two subsamples – before and after the financial crisis.
3. Sample, methodology and data
3.1. Sample
To assemble our sample, in the first step we identified the total population of commer-
cial banks in the surveyed countries. The total population of banks decreases linearly
from 127 banks in 2005 to 112 banks in 2010. In the next step we eliminated banks for
which we could not find annual reports and data on board structure, as well as banks
with unclear ownership structure, usually owned by investment funds. Finally, we
excluded banks without a dominant shareholder. Like La Porta et al. (2002), we believe
that a company has a dominant shareholder if this shareholder has more than 10% of
direct and indirect voting rights. In cases where a dominant shareholder is publicly
traded company, it is necessary to find the dominant shareholder of the dominant share-
holder, and so on, until dominant controller of the votes is found. We identify all share-
holders with at least 10% of the banks voting rights. In banks with more than one such
shareholder, the dominant shareholder is the one that has the largest share of voting
rights. In banks with few shareholders who have more than 3% of voting rights, we
check to determine whether two or more of these shareholders are affiliated, so that the
percentage of their joint ownership of voting rights exceeds that of the largest individual
shareholder. In such cases, joint owners are treated as the single largest shareholder.
Using present sampling procedure we identify a sample of 74 commercial banks
from four transition economies of South East Europe – Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia, representing about 55% of the total population of the
banks, about 65% of banking assets, about 66% of loans and about 68% of deposits in
surveyed countries. The structure of the sample by country approximates the structure
of the entire sample (Table 1). We build an unbalanced panel data of 377 bank-year
Table 1. Number and share of sample banks in total banking system assets by country and year.
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Serbia Pooled
2005 13 (49.15) 20 (72.20) 7 (50.66) 18 (65.48) 58
2006 15 (65.01) 17 (63.25) 9 (56.11) 19 (67.94) 60
2007 18 (69.11) 17 (63.47) 11 (62.79) 20 (68.83) 66
2008 19 (61.54) 16 (62.22) 11 (63.89) 18 (70.50) 64
2009 18 (62.16) 17 (60.24) 11 (65.16) 20 (70.57) 66
2010 16 (60.36) 16 (60.03) 12 (87.46) 19 (68.57) 63
Pooled 99 103 61 114 377
Notes: Share of sample banks in total banking system assets is in brackets.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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observations. We assemble data on share ownership and board structure, as well as
financial and market data for the 2005–2010 period, available in the banks’ annual
reports or proxy statements and on company websites, as well as in the reports of the
key financial institutions in surveyed countries (national banks, securities and exchange
commissions, stock exchanges).
3.2. Methodology
To examine the impact of bank governance, ownership structure and other bank-specific
factors on bank profitability, we use the regression analysis. We use the following
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification:












boINDit;o þ eit; (1)
where ROA stands for return on assets, proxy for bank profitability, BG for bank gover-
nance variables, CONC for ownership structure variables, BNK for bank-specific vari-
ables and IND for banking industry characteristics and macroeconomic environment.
We report three alternative models of the regression equation – for the whole sample
and two subsamples: before and after the financial crisis.
3.3. Data
As shown in equation (1), we use ROA as proxy for bank profitability. Majority of gov-
ernance studies focus on ROA (i.e. Bektas & Kaymak, 2009; Košak, 2011; Stančić
et al., 2012) and/or Tobin’s q ratio (i.e. de Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Dahya et al.,
2008), as proxies of bank performance. However, Tobin’s q might not accurately reflect
bank performance if stock market efficiency and liquidity deviates from the standards of
the developed stock markets, which is the case with SEE transition economies.
Therefore, we use only ROA, calculated as the ratio of income before taxes to the book
value of assets.
The potential determinants of profitability are grouped into four categories. Bank
governance variables are BS and BC. Banks in our sample have clear two-tier board
structure with separate supervisory and executive body. Like in some other studies on
bank governance (Busta, 2007; Stančić et al., 2012; Stefanelli & Cotugno, 2010), in
banks with two-tier board structure, BS is defined as the number of supervisory board
members. In order to determine the proportion of independent directors on the board
(BC), we use the criteria similar to those developed by Dahya et al. (2008). We believe
that the director is affiliated if he is: (1) the dominant owner; (2) employee of the bank;
(3) employee of any company or subsidiary of any company that is positioned above
the sample bank in the ownership tree; (4) employee of another firm in which the domi-
nant shareholder has at least 10% of voting rights, regardless of whether this company
is in the same ownership tree; (5) politician or employee of a government agency, when
the dominant shareholder is government; or (6) employee of a company domiciled in
the same country as the dominant shareholder when the dominant shareholder is a for-
eigner. Directors who are not affiliated are considered independent. BC is the number of
independent directors divided by the total number of directors on the board.
Bank ownership variables are ownership concentration ratio and ownership type. To
account for potential principal–principal conflict, we include ownership concentration
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ratio (CONC) into our analysis since this variable may have implications for firm
performance and board structure (La Porta et al., 2002). The ownership concentration
ratio is determined as the percentage of shares owned by the dominant shareholder.
Many studies examined whether ownership type (i.e. state, private and foreign owner-
ship) is related to bank efficiency. To account for ownership type we include following
three dummy variables: FRGN which equals one if more than 50% of bank shares are
owned by foreign owner, STAT which equals one for banks with more than 50% of
state ownership, and PRIV which equals one if more than 50% of bank shares are
owned by the residents.
Bank-specific variables are bank activity, capitalisation, and size. The ratio of loans
to total assets measures differences in banking business (LA), while the capital ratio is a
proxy for capital structure (CAR). To account for bank size we include the following
dummy variables: SMALL which equals one if bank has total assets below €100 mil-
lion, MEDI which equals one if bank has total assets of €100 million to €800 million,
and LARGE which equals one if bank has total assets over €800 million. Nominal vari-
ables are expressed in Euro and deflated using individual country GDP deflators (2005
is a base year). Banking industry and macroeconomic environment variables are the
ratio of bank deposits over GDP (DEP) which measures the relevance of the bank
deposits in each country, percentage share of five largest banks in country’s bank assets
(BC5), which measures the degree of concentration in the banking sector, and the real
GDP growth rate (GGR). We also use country and time dummies.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows average values of ROA and potential profitability determinants for over-
all sample and by country. The average board has almost six directors, out of which
26.67% are independent, indicating that there is one independent director on the average
bank board. In only 59 out of 377 bank-year observations (15.65% of observations)
there is a majority of independent directors on the board, while in 114 observations
(30.24%) there are no independent directors on the board. The average board is smaller
and less independent than the average board reported by some other studies on financial
(Adams & Mehran, 2008; de Andres & Vallelado, 2008), and non-financial firms
(Dahya et al., 2008; Yermack, 1996). These studies report that the average bank board
has 16–18 directors and up to 80% independent directors, while the average board in a
non-financial firm has 7–12 directors and at least 38% of independent directors. Small
boards made of majority of affiliated directors may point to a representation problem for
minority shareholders, although it should be noted that the board structure of average
bank in our sample changes constantly. Average BS decrease slightly from 5.71 direc-
tors in 2005 to 5.68 directors in 2010, while the average proportion of independent
directors increase from 24.45% to 29.41%.
Croatian banks have the highest CONC, and at the same time smallest and least
independent boards. This could imply that dominant shareholders with larger ownership
share tend to appoint smaller and less independent board, which again might point to a
representation problem for minority shareholders. A slightly different relationship can
be noted when looking at the average values by ownership type. Foreign banks have
the highest average CONC, largest and least independent boards, while privately held
domestic banks have the lowest CONC, smallest boards and the highest BC. Croatian
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banks are also the largest, have the lowest proportion of foreign ownership and the
highest proportion of private–domestic ownership, and have relatively high average
ROA. On the other hand, Macedonian banks have relatively large boards and the
highest BC, they are the smallest and have highest proportion of foreign ownership, and
at same time they are the most profitable. This could imply that banks may be equally
successful even though they have extremely different governance and ownership struc-
ture. This is consistent with the view that the flexibility of the structure, and not the
structure itself, is really crucial (Blaszczyk, Hashi, Radygin, & Woodward, 2003).
Table 2 also shows that BS and CONC increase, while the board independence
decreases monotonically with the increase in bank size. This result may be connected
with differences in average values between different types of ownership. Namely, for-
eign banks are the largest and, therefore, have the characteristics of large banks,
although the opposite may also be the true. Foreign investors entering emerging markets
usually buy large shareholdings of domestic banks or start wholly-owned subsidiary in
order to secure control over the bank activities in the conditions of weak investor pro-
tection. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) cite the example of one Russian investor (which
could easily be applied to SEE economies) pointing out that a Western investor can con-
trol a Russian company with 75% ownership, whereas a Russian investor can do so
with only 25% ownership, because he can use a variety of techniques against foreign
investors, including declaring some of their shares illegal, requiring super majorities to
bring issues on the agenda of shareholder meetings, losing voting records, etc. In our
sample, foreign dominant shareholder have less than 50% of voting rights in only 25
observations (11.21% of foreign banks), and less than 75% of voting rights in only 85
observations (38.12% of foreign banks).
Table 2. Average values of ROA and potential profitability determinants by year, country, bank
ownership and size.
Obs. ROA BS BC CONC Assets LA CAR
Average by year
2005 58 1.69 5.71 24.45 78.23 549.75 54.71 21.55
2006 60 1.25 5.82 23.93 78.46 671.47 54.24 22.24
2007 66 0.96 5.77 25.20 75.29 707.52 53.20 20.82
2008 64 0.47 5.69 27.07 79.44 720.25 59.69 19.97
2009 66 −0.10 5.74 29.58 77.38 678.90 57.80 19.21
2010 63 0.32 5.68 29.41 78.22 724.46 59.39 17.94
Average by country
Bosnia and Hezegovina 99 0.23 5.33 23.45 79.19 309.80 59.38 19.62
Croatia 103 0.97 5.25 22.53 82.54 1,511.81 60.77 13.59
Macedonia 61 1.23 6.18 32.00 77.67 209.76 53.51 23.31
Serbia 114 0.72 6.28 30.35 72.39 493.26 51.87 25.19
Average by ownership type
FRGN 223 0.40 6.02 17.20 88.17 970.62 57.20 17.11
STAT 74 0.36 5.77 34.91 75.98 338.72 53.84 27.62
PRIV 80 2.06 4.91 45.46 50.61 173.75 57.21 22.21
Average by size
Small 113 0.59 5.41 35.59 72.66 59.60 50.98 32.34
Medium 179 0.58 5.68 27.38 75.95 270.48 58.17 15.81
Large 85 1.30 6.29 13.31 88.55 2,356.04 60.51 13.53
Pooled 377 0.74 5.73 26.67 77.81 677.49 56.54 20.25
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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4.2. Univariate analysis
Table 3 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix between variables included in the analy-
sis along with their corresponding significance level. The matrix shows that ROA is
negatively and significantly correlated with BS and CONC, but positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with capital ratio and real GDP growth rate. This result implies that
we can expect to find that banks with higher CONC and larger boards are less profit-
able. On the other hand, important drivers of bank profitability are bank capitalisation
and real GDP growing rate. Matrix shows a positive but not statistically significant cor-
relation between ROA and BC. BC is found negatively and significantly correlated with
CONC. This is highest inter-correlation between two variables that appear together as
predictor variables in the analysis (0.48), so we do not expect problems with
multicollinearity.
4.3. Regression analysis
In this section we analyse the impact of bank governance, ownership structure, and
other bank-specific factors on bank profitability using the OLS regression specification
presented in equation (1). We rely on some earlier studies of this relationship, including
Stančić et al. (2012), Bektas and Kaymak (2009) and Pathan et al. (2007). Our depen-
dent variable is ROA. To eliminate problems regarding the standard errors, which affect
inference and the significance of the results, we undertake a heteroskedasticity robust
estimation using the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors method. Table 4
presents OLS regression estimates. We report three alternative models of the regression
equation – for the whole sample and two subsamples: before and after the financial
crisis. Before the financial crisis subsample include data-set of commercial banks over
the period 2005–2007, while after the financial crisis subsample covers the period
2008–2010.
The estimated coefficients of the bank governance variables indicate that bank profit-
ability decrease with increase of BS. This finding is consistent with the argument that
excessive boards lead to problems of coordination, control and flexibility in decision-
making, as well as with the findings of some studies on bank governance in emerging
economies (e.g. Pathan et al., 2007; Stančić et al., 2012). Furthermore, this means that
smaller boards are effective in monitoring bank managers and can contribute to bank
profitability more than large boards. Negative influence of BS on profitability of banks
in our sample may be due to the fact that large majority of banks in our sample do not
have nominating committee, nor predefined succession policy, so they may appoint
directors that do not have necessary experience, skills and expertise. In addition, BS sig-
nificantly negatively influence bank profitability before and after the occurrence of
financial crisis, which could be due to the ability of smaller boards to make decisions
faster in periods of extreme uncertainty.
BC is negatively, but insignificantly related to bank profitability. This result implies
that BC does not influence profitability of banks operating in SEE economies, which is
surprising given previous studies finding significant and often positive influence of
board independence over bank profitability in emerging economies (Bektas & Kaymak,
2008; Pathan et al., 2007). Non-correlation between board independence and bank prof-
itability can be explained with argument that the board has no power in countries with
weak protection of investors, since the board is at the mercy of the dominant share-
holder (Dahya et al., 2008) which is able to directly control bank activities and impose
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its own interests. Banks in our sample have highly concentrated ownership, and very
often one dominant (controlling) shareholder, while the legal and institutional system do
not provide strong institutional support to independent directors and protection of minor-
ity shareholders rights. Also, although independent directors are expected to better per-
form monitoring function then insiders, their ability to perform this function may be
fostered when there is additional expertise and resources (information) afforded by a
large board (see Abdul Kader, Adams, Hardwick, & Jean Kwon, 2011), and Table 2
shows that average bank board in our sample is relatively small. Our findings of the
influence of the board structure over bank profitability are consistent with the conclu-
sions from previous studies summarised by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). They find
that previous research has established that BC, as measured by the insider–outsider
Table 4. Results of the OLS regression analysis of profitability determinants.
Dep. ROA 2005–2010 2005–2007 2008–2010
Obs. 377 184 193
Intercept 7.242 −3.520 12.110
(1.182) (−0.274) (1.326)
Bank governance
BC −0.007 −0.010 −0.011
(−1.377) (−1.148) (−1.506)
BS −0.406*** −0.441*** −0.316***
(−4.998) (−3.892) (−2.590)
Bank ownership
CONC −0.010* −0.021** −0.003
(−1.654) (−2.164) (−0.458)
FRGN −1.767*** −1.504** −2.212***
(−3.841) (−2.268) (−3.531)
STAT −1.740*** −1.923*** −1.567***
(−4.241) (−2.954) (−3.199)
Bank variables
SMALL −2.001*** −0.861 −3.246***
(−4.293) (−1.304) (−5.312)
LARGE 1.785*** 1.469*** 1.996***
(6.929) (3.636) (5.566)
LA 0.004 0.022 −0.014
(0.328) (1.050) (−1.028)
CAR 0.084*** 0.068*** 0.105***
(5.813) (3.508) (5.453)
Banking industry
DEP −0.034 −0.084 −0.060
(−1.036) (−1.090) (−0.582)
BC5 0.012 0.158 −0.051
(0.148) (0.808) (−0.380)
GGR −0.049 0.198 0.022
(−0.325) (0.526) (0.109)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.345 0.316 0.404
Adjusted R2 0.309 0.246 0.346
F-value 9.388*** 4.503*** 6.976***
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistically significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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ratio, is not correlated with firm performance, while the number of directors on a firm’s
board is negatively related to the firm’s financial performance.
CONC is negatively, but weakly related with bank profitability. This relation is sig-
nificant only for the whole sample (p<0.1) and period before the crisis (p<0.05). In the
period after the financial crisis CONC loses its significance. This result is consistent
with the argument that ownership concentration in transition economies may provide
negative effect on performance because inadequate protection of minority shareholders
may provide majority shareholder with a possibility to expropriate substantial amounts
of corporate wealth (Filatotchev et al., 2001). After controlling for bank specific factors,
we also find that privately held domestic banks outperform both state-owned and foreign
banks, which is surprising given the findings from previous studies finding that foreign
banks outperform domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2001; Jemrić & Vujičić, 2002;
Micco et al., 2007; Tochkov & Nenovsky, 2011). This finding may be due to the fact
that privately held banks in our sample have much lower CONC and smaller boards, as
factors negatively related with bank profitability, than state-owned and foreign banks.
Mian (2003) finds that flatter hierarchical structure of private domestic banks allows
them to use ‘soft information’ to lend more at higher interest rate, which is consistent
with results in Table 2 showing that privately held domestic banks hold more assets in
form of loans than foreign and state banks. The same author adds that greater cultural
distance can make it more costly for foreign banks to collect and communicate soft
information.
Our results show that large banks are more profitable than small and medium sized
banks. Large banks are usually considered to have more professional management and
to be more cost conscious (Isik & Hassan, 2003). Their size allows them to exploit
economies of scale and have easier access to international financial markets (Brissimis,
Delis, & Papanikolaou, 2008). Bank capitalisation is positively and significantly related
to bank profitability which can be explained with lower funding costs and lower bank-
ruptcy and agency costs. Well-capitalised banks are able to attract more deposits with
lower interest rate because they offer implicit deposit insurance. Also, in accordance to
theory of moral hazard, managers of banks with less capital, which are often close to
bankruptcy, tend to make riskier decisions and pursue their own goals instead of share-
holder goals (Grigorian & Manole, 2006). At the same time, the owners with less capi-
tal to lose have less incentive to make sure that bank is operating efficiently. However,
it is not necessarily the level of capitalisation that defines the risk taking, but vice versa.
It should be noted that banks in our sample are well capitalised because of high national
requirements and high perceived risk of banks operating in transition economies. We
find no significant relation between loan production, proxied by ratio of loans to assets,
and bank profitability.
As a sensitivity test of our results we analyse the impact of bank governance, own-
ership structure, and other bank-specific factors on bank profitability proxied by return
on equity (ROE) which is in line with some previous studies (Košak, 2011; Košak &
Čok, 2008; Pathan et al., 2007). We calculate ROE as the ratio of income before taxes
to the book value of equity. Table 5 shows average values of ROE for overall sample,
by country and by year.
To eliminate problems regarding the standard errors we undertake a heteroskedastici-
ty robust estimation using the White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors
method. Table 6 presents OLS regression estimates. We report three alternative models
of the regression equation - for the whole sample and two subsamples: before and after
the financial crisis. Before the financial crisis subsample include data-set of commercial
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Table 5. Average values of ROE by year and by country.
Var. ROE Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia Macedonia Serbia Pooled
2005 8.55 12.32 10.47 6.03 9.30
2006 6.03 9.52 10.30 −1.15 5.39
2007 5.04 7.99 11.07 3.92 6.47
2008 −0.52 7.88 5.64 1.48 3.20
2009 −2.58 −3.36 1.98 −4.20 −2.51
2010 1.12 −5.85 4.76 −7.01 −0.51
Pooled 0.83 5.04 2.56 7.03
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Table 6. Results of the OLS regression analysis of profitability determinants.
Dep. ROE 2005–2010 2005–2007 2008–2010
Obs. 377 184 193
Intercept 99.047** 37.971 118.917*
(1.980) (0.668) (1.804)
Bank governance
BC −0.027 −0.014 −0.077
(−0.766) (−0.433) (−1.060)
BS −1.560*** −1.175** −1.535*
(−3.435) (−2.324) (−1.677)
Bank ownership
CONC −0.056* −0.079** −0.033
(−1.825) (−2.106) (−0.716)
FRGN −7.195** −3.096 −12.518**
(−2.112) (−1.042) (−2.040)
STAT −8.374*** −5.499** −11.802***
(−3.347) (−2.262) (−2.741)
Bank variables
SMALL −10.124*** −4.230 −17.763***
(−4.286) (−1.487) (−4.701)
LARGE 11.555*** 8.584*** 12.857***
(5.133) (3.659) (3.820)
LA 0.006 0.109 −0.051
(0.108) (1.444) (−0.634)
CAR 0.241*** 0.062 0.555***
(3.719) (0.343) (4.040)
Banking industry
DEP 0.099 0.066 0.335
(0.579) (0.206) (0.436)
BC5 −0.924 −0.283 −1.483
(−1.383) (−0.332) (−1.267)
GGR 0.547 1.365 0.334
(0.550) (0.743) (−0.146)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.259 0.251 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.217 0.175 0.201
F-value 6.212*** 3.269*** 3.838***
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. Statistically significant at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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banks over the period 2005–2007, while after the financial crisis subsample covers the
period 2008–2010. Table 6 shows that the regression coefficients when ROE is depen-
dent variable are almost the same like when ROA is dependent variable. BC is still not
correlated with bank profitability, while BS is negatively and significantly correlated
with bank profitability, although significance of this result is lower than with ROA.
Concerning ownership structure, the only difference is with foreign ownership in the
period before crisis, because this result is not significant. Interestingly, bank capitalisa-
tion is not significantly related with bank profitability measured by ROE in the period
before crisis, implying that bank capitalisation can protect bank profitability especially
in the periods of crisis and after the crisis.
5. Conclusions
We study 74 commercial banks from four transition economies of South East Europe to
explore the impact of bank governance, ownership structure and other bank specific fac-
tors on bank profitability. We find that the average board is smaller and less independent
than the average board of financial and non-financial firms in both emerging and devel-
oped economies. Small boards made of majority of affiliated directors may point to a
representation problem for minority shareholders, although it should be noted that the
average BS decreases, while the average proportion of independent directors increases.
We also find that foreign banks have the highest average ownership concentration ratio,
largest and least independent boards, while privately held domestic banks have the low-
est ownership concentration ratio, smallest boards and the highest proportion of inde-
pendent directors. This result may be explained with tendency of foreign banks to
increase ownership stake in order to secure control over the bank activities in the condi-
tions of weak investor protection.
We use a panel data OLS regression model to examine the impact of bank gover-
nance, ownership structure and other bank specific factors on bank profitability. As we
expected, we find negative and significant relationship between BS and bank profitabil-
ity which may be due to the fact that large majority of banks in our sample do not have
nominating committee, nor predefined succession policy, so they may appoint directors
that do not have necessary experience, skills and expertise. In addition, BS significantly
negatively influence bank profitability before and after the occurrence of financial crisis,
which could be due to the ability of smaller boards to make decisions faster in periods
of extreme uncertainty. Like we expected, the proportion of independent directors on
the board is negatively related to bank profitability. However, this result is statistically
insignificantly. This result can be explained with argument that the board has no power
in countries with weak protection of investors, since the board is at the mercy of the
dominant shareholder who is able to directly control bank activities and impose their
own interests.
In line with some previous studies and like we expected, ownership concentration
ratio is negatively, but weakly related with bank profitability. This result is consistent
with the argument that ownership concentration in transition economies may provide
negative effect on performance because inadequate protection of minority shareholders
may provide majority shareholder with a possibility to expropriate substantial amounts
of corporate wealth. We also find that privately held domestic banks outperform both
state-owned and foreign banks. This result is surprising given many previous studies.
This may be due to the fact that privately held domestic banks in our sample have much
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lower ownership concentration ratio and smaller boards, as factors negatively related
with bank profitability, than state-owned and foreign banks. Finally, we find that large
and well capitalised banks are more profitable than smaller and less capitalised banks.
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